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Does it make sense to deepen the economic cooperation
of the western balkan economies?
Goran Nikolic
Institute of European Studies, Belgrade, Serbia
ABSTRACT
The article discusses the structural changes in bilateral trade flows
between Western Balkan (WB) countries in 2007-2018. The basic
idea was to address whether there is a justification for the often
proposed deepening of economic cooperation among WB states.
After analysing the dynamics of mutual trade, we computed
the value of intra-industry trade, whose potential decrease could
indicate a divergence between observed trade structures. To
detect a possible structural change in WB trade sectors, qualita-
tive changes in those countries’ exports were calculated through
the tendencies of a share of products at higher levels of process-
ing. After calculating the export concentration coefficients, all the
results were compared with those achieved by these countries in
trade with the EU and in total. The article argues that there is no
solid reason to pursue policies for strengthening mutual eco-
nomic ties particularly towards a customs union, especially given
the more attractive prospect of EU integration.
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1. Introduction
The EU enlargement process is in a deep crisis, and it is doubtful that this will be sig-
nificantly changed with the newly proposed EU methodology for the Western
Balkans (WB) accession that has yet to be implemented (European Commission,
2020). Faced with persistent delays of their EU accession prospects, WB states them-
selves have made some efforts, at least publicly, to improve mutual cooperation. The
last of them was in October 2019, when the leaders of Albania, North Macedonia,
and Serbia announced that they would put into effect some sort of a mini-Schengen
zone allowing free movement of goods, services, and people (with other WB countries
expected to join soon). According to their public statements, the hope is that more
harmonised standards and faster border crossings for goods and people would open
up new markets for businesses and foster cross-border trade. A similarly ambitious
proposal, albeit one that has had no epilogue, was announced in 2017 when Serbia
declared that a paper had been drafted with Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina
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(B&H) on the possible creation of a customs union in the WB. It is important to note
that the term ‘Western Balkans’ was coined in the 2000s, originally encompassing the
countries of the former Yugoslavia without Slovenia, but also including Albania. Since
Croatia’s accession to the EU, six states comprise the WB (WB 6): Albania, B&H,
UNMIK-Kosovo (hereinafter Kosovo), Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia.
Roughly two decades ago the EU offered important trade preferences to the WB
economies with the aim of promoting their economic integration into European value
chains, among other things. Also with EU support, in 2006 came the (revised)
CEFTA with all WB economies plus Moldova becoming its members, which practic-
ally provides for tariff-free trade but in goods only. In fact, non-tariff barriers are not
prohibited and trade in services is not regulated, with frequent violations of the
agreement (for example in 2018 Kosovo imposed 100% tariffs on Serbian and
B&H goods).
There is an obvious lack of in-depth analyses of economic and trade relations in
the WB. In fact, we have no empirical research studies that look into the qualitative
structure of trade between WB countries and its implications. The question arises
whether enhanced cooperation, including the proposed customs union of WB econo-
mies, is the right step forward. By calculating several trade indicators, this paper aims
to reveal the structure and consequently the quality of bilateral trade flows between
WB economies. Based on the changes in their dynamics in the previous period, these
parameters can help us estimate future tendencies of observed bilateral trade flows,
among other things, by comparing them with the same indicators for WB-EU and
total WB merchandise trade.
The expected (potential) main contribution of this paper is to show, by using
extensive empirical evidence (expressed through numerous calculated indicators)
sourced from bilateral flow data between WB states, that the further intensification of
trade and economic integration among WB countries makes no sense, especially in
comparison with the much stronger significance of the EU for each and every
observed economy. Furthermore, on the basis of his calculations, the author argues
that potential enhanced trade integration between WB states could even have a nega-
tive political and economic impact, including the trade diversion effect. Given that
most of the relevant literature employs the gravity model, the very focus of this
research on the structural change of bilateral trade flows between WB states is a con-
tribution of its own kind.
Additionally, the usage of the disaggregated product-level bilateral export-import
trade data at the 3-digit SITC level is a technical contribution of this study. Using 3-
digit SITC disaggregation allows us to avoid the biases of lower levels of disaggregation.
Last but not the least, this is the first empirical research of the dynamic of performan-
ces of bilateral trade among WB states, and consequently of the economic effect of
trade integrations on the WB. The existing literature is usually focussed on the trade
relations between the EU and WB countries and it is hard to find studies that examine
the structure of trade between WB states themselves.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. The next section surveys the litera-
ture related to our topic. Section 3 presents the tested hypotheses, while the following
chapter discusses the dynamics of merchandise trade within WB economies. It is
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followed by Section 5 where intra-industry trade among WB states was calculated,
with the results being presented and interpreted. Changes in the WB’s export struc-
tures 2007-2018 – together with an analysis of export concentration indices in bilat-
eral trade flows – are explained in Section 6, which is followed by concluding
remarks and policy implications.
2. Literature review
In order to have a better understanding of bilateral trade flows between WB econo-
mies, a subset of literature has been selected. Different authors often conducted com-
parative studies on a sample that included a group of CEFTA members, EU
(potential) candidate countries (including Turkey), or WB states (including Croatia
until 2013). As all WB states are members of CEFTA (which also includes Moldova
which has marginal trade flows with the rest of the region, and Croatia until 2013),
most researchers dealt with this form of integration, given that it is (at least formally)
a free trade area. The first articles about the positive effects of regional trade integra-
tion were published shortly after the revised CEFTA appeared in 2006 (e.g. Bartlett,
2009; B€orzel & Risse, 2009; Druzic et al., 2009; Kathuria, 2008 Hamovic & Subic,
2007; Konopek, 2011; Masahiko, 2011). While these articles differ in various aspects,
such as methods, time frame, and sample size, they have reached several general
empirical and theoretical conclusions. It was shown that intra-regional trade appeared
to be led by the level of economic activity, then by cultural aspects such as similarity
between languages. In addition, the majority of authors also noticed that being neigh-
bouring countries and sharing the legacy of former Yugoslav market connections are
contributing factors to trade flows in the region. In contrast, non-tariff barriers have
a significant negative impact on trade between WB states.
Unlike this paper, most studies employed the gravity model, which seeks to predict
bilateral trade based on the economic size of an economy and its distance from trad-
ing partners. For example, the study by Braha et al. (2015, pp. 15–17) found that
preferential trade agreements, trade liberalisation, and cultural ties of the EU candi-
date countries facilitate trade flows. Variables such as language and membership in
common trade areas are found to be significant and raise the total export potential,
with the assumption that the existence of compatriot nationals in importer countries
could also play a role in export flows. The (augmented) gravity model of trade
between WB economies, employed by Ninka and Pere (2017), Klimczak and Trivic
(2015), Tosevska-Trpcevska and Tevdovski (2014), in general, showed that intra-
regional trade has been positively driven by the level of economic activity and to
some degree by cultural factors, while non-tariff barriers significantly reduce trade
exchanges between the countries in the region. War and the one-year-post-war effect
showed a strong and statistically important influence. Ranilovic (2017) showed that
Croatia traded more with higher-income and closer countries – which is in line with
the standard gravity model assumption – with a strong bias towards trade with coun-
tries of the former Yugoslavia, especially towards B&H where a strong Croatian com-
munity is based. Estimating a gravity equation, Choi and Asier (2019) raised the
question of whether and how much CEFTA increased Albanian export. It grew
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between 34% and 144%, depending on how the previous bilateral agreements with
CEFTA countries are accounted for, with the deciding factor being the reduction of
customs duties.
However, regarding the topic of our research, there are only a few papers question-
ing the reasons for CEFTA’s deepening, or even its very existence. While many
authors praise the achievements of CEFTA (Baranenko & Milivojevic, 2012;
Dragutinovic-Mitrovic & Bjelic, 2015; Hoti, 2015; Klimczak, 2016), others believe that
economic benefits are secondary and that the main goal of CEFTA is to prepare
countries for EU integration. Admittedly, this position doesn’t take into account agri-
cultural trade among WB states (that are CEFTA members), which has expanded
greatly since 2007 (Natos et al., 2014; Peshevski et al., 2013).
According to this group of scholars, CEFTA economic benefits are overrated and
the agreement is more of a platform for political cooperation. Among others, Begovic
(2011) notes that the general belief that trade liberalisation leads to enhanced com-
mercial performance does not apply to CEFTA states. The author used a sample con-
sisting of panel data, which includes CEFTA members and their major trading
partners in 1999-2007. The results of the gravity model suggest that trade liberalisa-
tion did not improve trade in the region for the period under review when control-
ling for other trade determinants, for example historical, political and ethnic
circumstances. Moreover, these countries tend to develop commercial relations with
the EU rather than within CEFTA. Additionally, prior to Kosovo imposing 100% tar-
iffs on Serbia and B&H, there was already a range of non-tariff barriers strongly ham-
pering mutual trade. Similar conclusions were proposed by The Economist (2017),
which pointed out that the short-term scope for intensifying intra-regional trade in
the WB has already been largely exhausted. One of the examples provided is that
Serbia was importing relatively low volumes from other WB countries and running a
very large trade surplus with them, thereby reflecting the weakness of WB’s exports
to the largest economy in the region. Also, Damijan et al. (2006) highlighted early on
that WB countries had reached their trade potential in almost all observed sectors,
and hence an increase of export and import flows of the WB with the EU and other
countries could be expected, as all these countries’ trade is below its potential with
the rest of the world.
A rather similar view was offered by Petreski (2018, pp. 303-309). Covering the
period 1996-2015, he measured the effect of the CEFTA on the current composition
of the members’ mutual trade. His results robustly indicate that CEFTA demonstrated
quite a big and statistically significant effect on its members’ trade. However, if the
instruments’ strict exogeneity cannot be reached by arguments or statistical tools,
then the conclusions can show that the CEFTA effect’s rise may be rather driven, at
least in part, by the correlation between the instrument and trade shocks. Namely, in
his earlier study, Petreski (2013) pointed out that although empirical evidence sug-
gests that CEFTA exercised a positive, significant, and large impact on trade in
Southeast Europe, these findings can to a large degree be ascribed to the disrupted
trade flows in the region over the 1990s.
Additionally, according to Jusufi and Bellaqa (2019, p. 75), intra-regional trade
between WB states has been in decline over the last several years, as non-tariff
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barriers, induced by political problems, strongly and negatively impacted trade in the
region. On top of that, regional businesses are also underdeveloped, due to the pre-
sent trade distortions largely caused by administrative rigidities, despite recent institu-
tional development and economic growth in the WB (Sklias & Tsampra, 2013).
Generally, efforts towards economic integration through the CEFTA have not
increased the shares of trade with the WB despite the proximity, but the opposite
happened as the EU increased its dominant trade position for all WB countries
(World Bank, 2017, pp. 15-16). A comprehensive study by the European Commission
(2018) stated that overall intra-regional trade has been stagnant, and has even rela-
tively decreased since the 2009 crisis. Exports and imports among WB states have
remained concentrated in goods with low value-added (consisting largely of minerals,
base metals, and foodstuffs) and their structure did not change significantly in 2007-
2016 (pp. 10-12, 20). Crudu et al. (2018, pp. 55-60) showed that although the CEFTA
agreement was primarily beneficial for the countries’ economic relations with their
neighbours and the EU, it has not had a determinative impact on economic develop-
ment, trade, and investments. In an effort to uncover the reasons for the lack of success
of ongoing WB economic integration initiatives, Sklias (2011) came to the conclusion
that only a top-down approach – an EU/International Community imposed action –
can yield results, unlike authentic endeavours channelled by WB states.
The common conclusion stemming from several above-mentioned studies is that
CEFTA’s positive and significant impact on bilateral trade is largely a consequence of
the severely restricted trade due to wars and sanctions in the last decade of the 20th
century and that WB states have already reached their full potential for mutual trade.
Consequently, the question arises whether the further strengthening of mutual
cooperation makes sense.
3. Tested hypotheses
This part of the research presents the hypotheses that are to be tested. As stated, the
objective of this article is to analyse the currently very important and topical issue of
whether deepening economic cooperation among WB economies would make eco-
nomic sense. Our hope is that a structural analysis of bilateral trade flows in 2007-
2018, at a highly disaggregated level, should give an answer to this question. To
explore this issue, we propose the following three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: From 2007 to 2018 the shares of merchandise trade of the WB 6’s
economies with each other has decreased in most observed cases, as well as
cumulatively, indicating the reduced significance of their mutual bilateral trade.
This hypothesis will be tested by calculating tendencies of mutual merchandise
trade between these six economies in 2007 and 2018. Along with the share of every
country in total exports and imports of the remaining WB economies, tendencies of
the average absolute annual growth of trade (total, with the EU, and with the rest of
the WB, expressed in EUR) will be computed. Also, to gain insight into the relevance
of overall trade within those countries relative to the total trade of the WB 6, we will
calculate the share of cumulative exports and imports to and from the WB and put it
in relation to cumulative exports and imports of all WB economies. A presumed
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAŽIVANJA 3457
decrease of shares in mutual trade between those countries, all of which are CEFTA
members, would suggest a reduced relative importance of this free trade area (with a
consequential reduced trade impact on the overall economic performances of those
six states), thereby suggesting that further efforts to enhance cooperation (through a
customs union, for example) are most likely to be futile, due to the increased signifi-
cance of other partners for those economies.
Hypothesis 2: In the period under review, intra-industry trade between the WB 6 has
substantially decreased, creating in this way no conditions for a quality improvement of
bilateral merchandise trade and indicating a further deceleration in export and import
flows between these economies.
To accept or reject this hypothesis, the most common technique of measuring the
share of intra-industry trade – the Standard Grubel-Lloyd index (Grubel and Lloyd
1975, pp. 21–23) will be used. It measures the degree of intra-industry trade due to
product differentiation, which indicates how a country simultaneously imports and
exports varieties of a particular product. In the aggregate intra-industry trade index,
higher ratios suggest that the economies of scale and various sources of gains are
being exploited. The fall of intra-industry trade between WB states would indicate a
deterioration of their bilateral trade flow quality, implying the continuation of a slower-
than-average growth of their mutual trade. Even the stagnation of intra-industry trade,
given its empirically proven tendency to grow worldwide, would suggest a negative
structural development in bilateral trade flows between WB economies.
Hypothesis 3: From 2007 to 2018 the export quality of WB bilateral trade flows in the
majority of observed cases has shifted towards a decreased portion of products at higher
levels of processing (or retained roughly the similar share), indicating a deterioration (or
stagnation) of the WB 6’s bilateral trade structures.
This hypothesis will be tested using the methodologies developed by Mayer and
Wood (2001), Munkacsi (2009), and UNCTAD (2019). A presumed decreasing share
of products at higher levels of processing (those with higher factor intensity and
advanced technology structure) in total exports would suggest a qualitative deterior-
ation of mutual trade between those economies, given the lower share of products
with higher value-added. The qualitative changes in the WB 6’s mutual trade are
measured through tendencies in the shares of skill-intensive manufactures, (medium-
and) high-tech products, and high-skill and technology-intensive manufactures
(between 2007 and 2018), where higher-level indicates their better quality. Analysing
export quality in this way is especially important given that the basic condition for
accelerating export growth is its structural improvement.
4. Dynamics of merchandise trade within Western Balkan economies
The data on countries’ exports (and imports) structures are drawn from the United
Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE). We have used the
structure of exports and imports by Standard International Trade Classification
(SITC), encompassing 261 merchandise groups at the SITC 3-digit level (Revision 4).
The first year for which we have data at this level of disaggregation is 2007, while the
last available year is 2018. The UN COMTRADE database provides no data for both
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observed years for the following pairs of countries: Albania-Montenegro, B&H-
Montenegro, and B&H-Albania, and there is no data for Kosovo at all (as it is not a
member of the UN). It is important to note that there are often differences between
data if they are mirrored, which is mostly a consequence of the different capabilities
of national statistical offices to collect them (they are the ultimate sources of data for
the UN COMTRADE). Hence, we applied two rules. First, we used data from coun-
tries that have data for both observed years (for example, this was the case when we
analysed trade flows between North Macedonia and B&H, where only the former had
data for 2007). Second, we have chosen as our primary source the country with the
bigger export in the selected years, presuming that a larger sample leads to smaller
error probability.
When it comes to the total volumes of trade between the EU and WB states, first
and foremost we used the (official) EUROSTAT (online) database. Data referring to
total trade between WB countries are taken from the CEFTA (official) statistical por-
tal (for 2018), while for 2007 – in the absence such a source – we have had to use
national statistical sources. All statistical sources are listed in the appendix.
On the basis of our calculation, using values expressed in EUR, which can be seen
in Graph 1 and in Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix, there are clear signs of a
decrease in the significance of WB trade flows (CEFTA minus Moldova) for most
WB economies. Namely, because of a slower trade growth from and to CEFTA mem-
bers in the observed period, shares of exports and imports to and from them
have decreased.
4.1. Graph 1
The shares of the rest of the WB countries in total exports and imports of six
WB countries
Simplifying the matter, we aggregated merchandise exports (and imports) for all
six countries observed and did the same with their intra-WB exports and imports
(their mutual trade is counted twice in both cases). The results clearly indicate that
Figure 1. The shares of the rest of the WB countries in total exports and imports of six WB
countries. Source: See Appendix 1.
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cumulative exports (and imports) between WB countries relative to their total exports
(and imports) decreased significantly in the period 2007-2018.
This is especially pronounced when it comes to export (the share of which fell
from slightly more than one-fourth to 17.6%) and to a lesser extent when merchan-
dise import is regarded (the portion of which was 10.9% in 2007 and 9.4% in 2018).
Namely, in the observed period cumulative exports of WB states have grown at high
rates (on average 8.4% annually), increasing their volumes, expressed in EUR, almost
two and a half times. At the same time the exports of those economies to the remain-
ing WB countries have grown at a significantly slower rate (by 61% cumulatively or
4.4% on average annually), thereby reducing their shares in total export. The cumula-
tive imports of those economies have grown slower because of the effects of the
Great Recession (by 62%, on average 4.5% annually), but still at an undoubtedly
faster pace than the increase of cumulative imports from CEFTA members (by 36%,
on average just 2.8% annually). So, the cumulative trade of those six economies has
risen at a much faster pace than their mutual bilateral trade.
The opposite pattern was detected in the export of those six states to the EU 28.
Namely, the share of their cumulative export to the EU in their total export has
grown from 67.7% in 2007 to 69% 11 years later, growing at an average annual rate
of 8.4%. At the same time, the increment of EU import share in total imports was
similar (by 1.4 percentage points, to 59%), rising at an average annual rate of 4.7%.
Looking at particular WB countries, the average annual export growth in this
period amounted to 8.7% for Serbia, 7.9% for B&H, 8.1% for North Macedonia,
10.8% for Albania, 7.5% for Kosovo, while the average export growth to the rest of
the WB was generally lower, amounting to 4.2% in the case of Serbia, 5.7% for B&H,
just 0.6% for N. Macedonia, 16.4% for Albania, and 9.3% for Kosovo. Yet, in the
smallest economy of the WB, Montenegro, the share of exports with WB states
increased (and the total export even fell in the observed 11 years, while export to the
rest of the WB rose at an average annual rate of 2.3%), which was also the case with
Albania’s export and import to CEFTA members (due to increased trade flows with
Kosovo). In addition, B&H’s imports have also shown a marginal share growth when
it comes to CEFTA economies. However, given the cumulatively modest sizes of the
mentioned economies and their merchandise trade to the overall trade flows in the
WB, it is clear that there is a tendency of reduced significance of bilateral trade flows
between these six economies, especially in view of the growing significance of trade
with the EU for those countries (in 2014, compared to 2001, total exports to ‘third
countries’ increased by about 16 billion EUR, and only by about 4.5 billion EUR
among the countries in the region, according to Ninka & Pere, 2017, pp. 108–110).
So, our first hypothesis can be accepted, as from 2007 to 2018 the shares of merchan-
dise trade of the WB 6’s economies with each other have decreased in most observed
cases, as well as cumulatively.
5. Tendencies of intra-industry trade in the Western Balkans
The standard Grubel–Lloyd index measures the degree of intra-industry trade due to
product differentiation with scale economies, which indicates how a country
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simultaneously imports and exports varieties of a particular product. As a rule, the
index is given as the share of intra-industry trade in total trade. In the absence of
trade within the same product groups (or industries), the index will be zero. In the
opposite case, when exports and imports are equal for all products at a given level of
disaggregation the index will be one. Bigger shares of intra-industry trade indicate
that the economies of scale and various sources of gains are being utilised. Therefore,
if the bilateral Grubel–Lloyd index is relatively high for a highly aggregated set of
merchandise trade flow data (at the SITC 3-digit level), it can be inferred that a rela-
tively large proportion of bilateral trade in this data set is associated with two-way








GLj– intra-industry trade index for total trade between the two countries; Xij(Mij)
– exports (imports) of product ‘i’ for country ‘j’, where ‘i’ (sector, merchandise
group)¼ 1…N
A low index value indicates the possibility of significant structural adjustment costs
due to increased competition from other countries. It also suggests that the country is
not making a significant income from horizontal and vertical integration into the
world economy and is not taking advantage of selling products in large markets and
from specialisation in certain areas. It has been empirically proven that a possible rise
of intra-industry trade is an indicator of economic development, as well as a sign of a
reduced technological gap compared to advanced economies.
5.1. Results
We calculated the Standard Grubel–Lloyd index, meaning intra-industry trade
between WB states for 2007 and 2018. Results are given in Table 1, which shows that
in the majority cases a fall of indices was detected between the two observed years.
Looking at intra-industry trade between the economies of the region, the only cases
of growth of the Grubel–Lloyd index were detected in merchandise trade between
B&H and N. Macedonia and N. Macedonia and Albania. On the other hand, when it
comes, for example, to bilateral trade flows between Serbia and B&H there is a clear
falling trend of intra-industry trade in the observed period, as well as when Serbia –
North Macedonia merchandise trade is concerned. The relatively low values of
Table 1. Standard Grubel–Lloyd index 2007 and 2018 for merchandise trade between WB economies.
trade partners: 2007 2018
Serbia N. Macedonia 0.345 0.284
Serbia B&H 0.260 0.244
N. Macedonia B&H 0.192 0.264
N. Macedonia Albania 0.125 0.144
N. Macedonia Montenegro 0.067 0.065
Serbia Montenegro 0.111 0.096
Serbia Albania 0.133 0.096
Source: Author’s own calculation based on the UN COMTRADE database.
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obtained indices, as well as their dynamics, are not good signs. Things look worse
given the empirically detected growing trend of these coefficients in general, but also
of the total trade of WB economies (for example, Kosovo recorded a growth of this
index from 0.085 to 0.127, while the rise in the case of Serbia was more pronounced
– from 0.420 in 2007 to 0.540 in 2018). Yet, the development of trade with the EU
seems even more important. Namely, in Table A3 in the appendix, it can be seen
that all six WB economies detected a strong growth of intra-industry trade with the
EU in the period under review. In this regard, the transition experience of European
countries is particularly important for WB economies, and they detected a strong
growth of the same indicator since the 1990s, making their economies more similar
to the EU economies in the so-called catching-up process (Kawecka-Wyrzykowska
2008, p. 15).
As the empirical experience of developed countries, including economies in
Central Europe, shows, intra-industry trade has opened up new areas of cooperation
leading to the development of global value chains (GVCs). Given the low and declin-
ing indicators of intra-industrial trade between the WB states, it is clear that this type
of cooperation between these countries has practically not been achieved, which is in
line with the general experience. Overall, the ‘happier’ countries in the region are
attracting FDI, mainly from the EU, thus creating value chains and dominant trade
flows. In view of all this, there does not seem to be room for any other kind of eco-
nomic integration, including enhanced regional cooperation (such as a customs
union, for example), especially among non-complementary economies – which is the
case with those of the WB.
6. The change of the Western Balkans’ export structures 2007–2018
Given the crucial role of changing the nature of the skill and technological compos-
ition of products to improve economic performance, the purpose of this part of the
paper is to investigate the change in the quality of WB exports by classifying them
according to the applied level of skill and technology. Trade merchandise groups (261
of them) are used to compute different indicators to show how countries are moving
out from primary commodities to manufactures-skill and technology content sectors,
including high-tech products. Namely, a higher-level of applied skill and technology
content suggests better quality of a given product or merchandise group. It should be
reiterated that the basic condition for accelerating export growth is its structural
improvement.
We used the UNCTAD (2019) methodology with all merchandise groups classified
into five categories, where we were focussed on high-skill and technology-intensive
manufactures. They cover Section 5 of Standard International Trade Classification
(SITC), SITC divisions 75, 76, 87, 88 and SITC merchandise groups 776, 792, 891,
892, 896, 897 and 898.
Then, in line with the methodology developed by Mayer and Wood (2001, pp. 9-
10), we extracted the shares of skill-intensive manufactures in WB bilateral export
flows. The point is that manufacturing sectors (industries) are positioned by their
skilled/unskilled labour ratios or other measures of skill intensity. A wide explanation
3462 G. NIKOLIĆ
of this type of classification is also given in the study by Nikolic, but what is import-
ant for our analysis is that chemicals, machinery, cars, aircraft, and instruments are
classified as skill-intensive, which will be used as a proxy for the achieved level of
exports sophistication.
After that, we have used the methodology developed by Munkacsi (2009). He clas-
sified exports according to technology structure into four categories, but the most
important objective for us was to extract medium- and high-tech products from all
other goods. Then, we calculated the shares of high-tech products alone as well as the
cumulative portions of medium- and high-tech products in the total export. These
types of products – with higher processing levels – largely determine the overall qual-
ity of a country’s export structure. An eventually growing share of these products in
bilateral trade flows would suggest a qualitative improvement of mutual trade
between WB countries. Which merchandise groups make up these categories is also
explained in detail in a study by Munkacsi (2009), but generally they include the
majority of products belonging to Sector 5 (Chemicals and related products) and
Sector 7 (Machinery and transport equipment).
All of the mentioned classifications have been used in numerous studies.
According to Fabrizio et al. (2006), a growing high-tech export share causes higher
unit value compared with other countries, also showing that, with deeper integration
into the EU, CEE states’ export structure had significantly improved. Crespo and
Fontoura (2007) examined the new member states’ exports of goods going to the
EU15 in time and by cross-section. The share of low-skill exports decreased sharply.
The Czech and Hungarian export structure has strongly improved, becoming the
most similar to that of long-time EU member states, with the Hungarian export
structure resembling mainly the Austrian and German examples. Landesmann and
Worz (2006) analysed the export specialisation of new CEE member states and
pointed out that, considering medium and high-tech products, specialisation
increased (which the authors explained by unit labour costs).
Shimbov et al. (2019) stated that export sophistication has a positive and signifi-
cant effect on growth in WB economies and that this process, associated with greater
participation in GVCs, is more driven by the sophistication of medium-skill and tech-
nology-intensive manufacture products than by the sophistication of high-skill goods.
The paper by Trlakovic et al. (2018) showed that commodity groups produced by
medium-low and low technology industries had the greatest effect on the change in
the volume of GDP p/c in WB countries (including Croatia) in 2005–2015.
6.1. Results
As proposed, we calculated the shares of the four mentioned product groups accord-
ing to applied skill and technology content. Table 2 shows: the shares of Cumulative
medium- and High-Tech products (MediumþHigh-Tech), Skill-intensive manufacture
products, High-Skill and technology-intensive manufactures, and High-Tech products in
the exports of WB countries to other WB economies. As the classified products’ cate-
gories showed totally different tendencies for different trading flows, there are signifi-
cantly different trends regarding the observed bilateral trade flows. For example,
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looking at the Serbian export to N. Macedonia, all four applied product categories
detected a solid share growth, implying the improved quality of exports from Serbia
to its southern neighbour. Yet, a worldwide growing trend of this kind of products in
international trade should be noted, which certainly makes this achieved progress of
Serbia’s export sector less relevant. On the other hand, B&H’s export to Serbia has
strongly deteriorated from 2007 to 2018, as shares of cumulative Medium- and high-
tech products and Skill-intensive manufacture products have almost halved. When
the Serbian export structure to B&H is concerned there is an improvement of
two wider covering indicators, with a fall of High-Tech and High-skill technology-
intensive products’ shares. While the Macedonian export to B&H and Albania has
solidly improved, its import from the same markets has shown an opposite trend.
Serbia improved its export structure to Albania, while Albanian export to Serbia prac-
tically stagnated at a very low achieved structural level. North Macedonia largely
improved its export quality to Montenegro, while a strong deterioration of the export
Table 2. Shares of (Medium- and) High-Tech products, Skill-intensive manufactures, and High-skill
and technology-intensive manufacture products in merchandise trade flows between WB
economies in 2007 and 2018.
2007 2018 2007 2018
Serbia-N. Macedonia N. Macedonia-Serbia
MediumþHigh products 21.5 27.9 18.1 17.4
Skill-intensive manufacture products 20.5 26.5 16.4 16.4
High-Skill & technology-intensive 14.5 18.2 11.2 14.1
HIGH-TECH 3.4 4.2 7.9 9.7
N. Macedonia- Monten. Montenegro- N. Maced.
MediumþHigh products 27.9 22.7 35.1 4.9
Skill-intensive manufacture products 20.5 20.9 30.2 4.5
High-Skill & technology-intensive 12.5 16.3 5.7 1.7
HIGH-TECH 9.0 12.7 3.9 1.3
Serbia - Montenegro Montenegro - Serbia
MediumþHigh products 29.4 34.2 15.5 13.5
Skill-intensive manufacture products 27.2 31.5 13.0 15.0
High-Skill & technology-intensive 16.6 19.7 10.5 14.3
HIGH-TECH 7.8 8.5 8.7 9.1
N. Macedonia - B&H B&H - N. Macedonia
MediumþHigh products 24.1 27.8 21.3 14.7
Skill-intensive manufacture products 22.2 26.5 22.0 11.2
High-Skill & technology-intensive 14.2 22.3 11.0 6.2
HIGH-TECH 13.2 17.4 2.8 2.2
Serbia - B&H B&H - Serbia
MediumþHigh products 24.4 26.9 17.2 9.4
Skill-intensive manufacture products 23.2 24.7 16.8 9.1
High-Skill & technology-intensive 16.8 15.2 9.1 7.0
HIGH-TECH 6.3 4.1 3.7 2.6
N. Macedonia - Albania Albania - N. Macedonia
MediumþHigh products 17.6 22.9 18.4 4.4
Skill-intensive manufacture products 16.7 24.0 7.6 4.3
High-Skill & technology-intensive 14.8 21.6 12.3 2.7
HIGH-TECH 4.3 7.7 4.3 1.8
Serbia - Albania Albania-Serbia
MediumþHigh 11.4 26.3 1.2 1.7
Skill-intensive manufacture products 11.3 25.2 1.2 1.4
High-Skill & technology-intensive 10.2 17.8 1.3 1.0
HIGH-TECH 5.6 5.6 0.0 0.1
Note: MediumþHigh products ¼ (Combined) Medium- and high-tech products; High Skill & technology-
intensive¼High-skill and technology-intensive manufactures; HIGH-TECH¼High-Tech products.
Source: Author’s own calculation based on the UN COMTRADE database.
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structure was detected in the opposite direction. As expected, Serbia has the highest
shares of high processing export products, while smaller WB economies like Albania
or Montenegro have the smallest portions of this kind of product, especially High
Tech. Looking at the first two categories, which are more inclusive and practically
encompass all merchandise groups from SITC Sector 5 and 7, the situation is essen-
tially the same.
In summary, Table 2 showed so divergent structural trends that there is no easy
way to draw a clear conclusion. Therefore, the initial hypothesis referring to the stag-
nating or decreasing share of products at higher levels of processing in overall bilat-
eral trade flows between WB 6 countries can neither be accepted nor rejected.
Namely, the results are inconclusive since in half of the observed 56 cases structures
have deteriorated or stagnated from 2007 to 2018. At the same time, in the other half
of observed cases, the structures were improved.
But the analysis was not yet complete: we then computed the same indicators
regarding both the total and export to the EU from WB economies. What is striking
is that almost all observed WB countries recorded an improvement of their export
structure in 2018 compared to 2007, at the same time achieving a significantly higher
level of export sophistication compared to regional trade flows (results are given in
Tables A4 and A5 in the appendix). In view of similar trends in Central and Eastern
European countries and in emerging markets, the conclusion suggested by these ten-
dencies is that the detected trends in bilateral trade flow in WB can be seen in some-
what different contexts. Namely, given the improvement of export structure not only
worldwide, but also when export to the EU or the total export of those same states is
concerned (see: World Bank, 2019, 11-21), the trade structure detected among WB
countries can also be seen as very unfavourable, both in terms of its dynamics and
especially in terms of the achieved level of export sophistication.
6.2. Tendencies of export concentration coefficient in WB bilateral trade flows
In order to better understand the change in bilateral export structures, we have used
the export concentration ratio (Cxj), also known as the Herfindahl-Hirschmann
index. This index ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 reflecting the least concentrated export
(import) portfolio and 1 the most concentrated (UNDP, 2011, 44). Export concentra-
tion reflects the degree to which a country’s exports are concentrated on a small
number of products. It is normalised because the number of merchandise products
differs from country to country.
The decline in export concentration ratios was a tendency in almost all countries
in the post-World War II period, especially in the last two decades of the 20th cen-
tury. In addition, it is natural for smaller (as well as less developed) countries, like
those in the WB, to have higher ratios of exports because they can’t sufficiently diver-
sify their export offer.
It is empirically proven that at some point developed countries began to raise this
coefficient, as they were generally achieving some specialisation in high value-added
products. Given that the export concentration ratio of country A to country B is at
the same time the import concentration ratio of state B to state A, there is no need
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAŽIVANJA 3465

















where i¼ 1… n, n ¼ number of SITC 3-digit export categories (about 260);
Xij¼ value of export of sector ‘‘i’’ from the country ‘‘j’’ in a given year; Xj¼ total
export volume of the relevant country in the same year.
We have calculated the export concentration ratio of WB 6 in their trade with
each other. To interpret this indicator for economies that are not developed and trade
with each other in a totally different context depending on various non-economic fac-
tors (the legacy of former Yugoslavia, common languages, ongoing political disputes)
is very tricky. However, the results could provide an additional explanatory tool in
our efforts to address the fundamental question of this paper: whether the deepening
of economic integration in the WB makes economic sense.
Based on empirical data, a fall of export concentration would be an expected ten-
dency given the reciprocal mutual opening of these countries (diversification of
import demand) in the last two decades and the growth of the absolute level of bilat-
eral trade, which is in line with the increase in the purchasing power of the popula-
tion of those economies. Also, given that the fall of export concentration has been a
global tendency in the last decades, we can also expect to detect spill-over effects of
this trend on bilateral levels.
In line with this, our calculations presented in Table 3 show that export concentra-
tion ratios have mostly decreased, excluding some rising bilateral trade flows, largely
between smaller WB economies. As expected, as the largest economy in the region
Serbia has the lowest level of bilateral export concentration ratios, which is, among
other things, a consequence of the size of its exports. When it comes to the dynamics
of the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index regarding merchandise trade flows between
Serbia and B&H, there is a clear falling trend of both Serbian export concentration to
B&H, and Bosnian export concentration to Serbia. The situation is the same with
Serbia’s trade with North Macedonia. However, there is a fall in the concentration of
B&H’s export to Macedonia, but a rising concentration of Macedonian exports to
Table 3. Export concentration ratio (Herfindahl-Hirschmann index) in 2007 and 2018 (merchandise
export from one WB economy to another).
Bilateral trade flows 2007 2018 Bilateral trade flows 2007 2018
Serbia N. Macedonia 0.089 0.075 N. Macedonia Serbia 0.166 0.154
Serbia B&H 0.075 0.075 B&H Serbia 0.298 0.239
N. Macedonia B&H 0.161 0.185 B&H N. Macedonia 0.210 0.172
N. Macedonia Albania 0.192 0.186 Albania N. Macedonia 0.337 0.441
N. Macedonia Montenegro 0.123 0.143 Montenegro N. Macedonia 0.170 0.452
Serbia Albania 0.127 0.063 Albania Serbia 0.330 0.219
Serbia Montenegro 0.074 0.063 Montenegro Serbia 0.375 0.219
Source: Author’s own calculation based on the UN COMTRADE database.
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B&H. The majority of bilateral trade flows show a similar picture, but there are also
exceptions, particularly when it comes to smaller economies. The most drastic
example is the export of Montenegro to N. Macedonia, which became strongly con-
centrated in 2018. The high level of the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index in some WB
economies generally represents a poor diversification of those states. High export con-
centration ratios detected in Montenegro, Albania, and Kosovo in their trade with
other WB economies are caused by a strong share of only a handful of commodity
groups, always resource- or labour-intensive ones. These examples indicate why it
wouldn’t be good to see a significant increase in the specialisation of those economies
because, given the domestic factor availability, or production potential, it would prac-
tically mean that these countries were strongly increasing the share of certain prod-
ucts at the lower processing stage, which generally has a low unit value. Generally
speaking, and especially in the medium- to long-run, the preferred route is export
diversification, basing exports on a large number of products in multiple phases of
finalisation, and most preferably export-based on new products.
However, overall development suggests that the level of export diversification has
not achieved significant improvements given the relatively high level of export con-
centration ratios despite a decreasing tendency. So, in spite of these empirically tested
and expected tendencies, the overall picture is far from simple, adding to the incon-
clusive statement regarding the previous part of this chapter. Namely, even the rela-
tively low and decreasing values of the coefficients in the case of bilateral trade
between Serbia and B&H and Serbia and Macedonia, similar to those of the devel-
oped countries, are not a consequence of the broad supply of those countries’ export
sector and its favourable structure; instead, they were above all caused by a lack of
certain competing products. Namely, there are often only a few merchandise groups
that have a significant share, and these are, as a rule, primary, resource, or labour-
intensive products. This statement can be easily verified by looking into the structure
of bilateral trade flows between WB economies. For example, as much as 29% of
Serbian import from N. Macedonia, that is N. Macedonian export to Serbia was
made up of merchandise groups belonging to division 67 (Iron and steel), which are
certainly not products of a high phase of finalisation. As much as half of
the Macedonian export to Montenegro consisted of agricultural products (sector 0-
Food and division 11-Beverages), indicating the unfavourable structure of their
mutual trade.
To provide additional comparative insight, we calculated the concentration ratio of
both total and exports of those countries to the EU. These ratios are, as expected,
lower than their bilateral ratios, which is unsurprising given the significantly larger
number of products that they export. However, some WB economies still have a high
export concentration index of total export, especially Albania, Montenegro, and even
Macedonia (0.222), indicating the poor diversification of those economies. For
example, in Montenegro, a very high level of export concentration ratio in 2018
(0.339) was caused by the fact that a single merchandise group accounted for one
third of total exports (684-Aluminum). It was even worse in 2007 when the same
index was 0.784. A similar situation emerged in Albania (0.541) where the share of
851 (Footwear) was about one quarter in 2018, which is certainly not a good
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indicator given the low level of value-added in this kind of product. The situation is
better in Serbia (with this index being stable - 0.088 in 2007 and 0.080 in 2018) and
B&H (0.108 in 2018), while Kosovo has decreased its concentration ratio level in the
last 11 years (to 0.133 from 0.175). When it comes to export to the EU, all six states
recorded declining tendencies, as expected, but the achieved level of this indicator is
– excluding Serbia and B&H – relatively high (see Table A6 in the appendix).
These findings, along with the previous ones relating to change in WB trade struc-
tures, are certainly inconclusive. Yet, it can be assumed, especially in view of the ten-
dencies of WB exports both total and to the EU, which recorded a significant
improvement in the period under review, as well as the worldwide trend of decreas-
ing export specialisation, that the basic assumption of the article can be accepted with
a dose of reservation.
7. Concluding remarks
The objective of this article is to empirically examine the bilateral trade of WB coun-
tries in the period 2007-2018. The basic idea was to address the justification for the
often proposed deepening of economic cooperation among WB states.
After analysing the dynamics of mutual trade, the value of intra-industry trade was
calculated. Then, qualitative changes in those countries’ exports were computed
through tendencies of the share of goods at higher levels of processing, followed by a
calculation of trade concentration coefficients. All results were compared with those
achieved by these countries in trade with the EU and in total.
First, two of the tested hypotheses are accepted. Namely, from 2007 to 2018 the
shares of merchandise trade of the WB 6’s economies with each other have decreased
in most observed cases, as well as cumulatively, indicating the decreasing significance
of trade cooperation in the region, expressed mostly through CEFTA. In that context,
the significantly slower-than-average growth of their mutual trade in the observed
period is only a sign of these processes. In fact, the results clearly indicate that cumula-
tive exports (and imports) between WB countries relative to their total exports (and
imports) decreased significantly in the 2007–2018 period. This is especially pronounced
in exports (with the share falling from slightly more than one-fourth to 17.6%), while
the opposite trend was detected for the export of those six states to the EU 28.
The second hypothesis is also valid: in 2018, compared to 2007, intra-industry
trade (derived from bilateral trade flows in the region) has mostly decreased. The
relatively low values of obtained indices, as well as their falling dynamics, suggest a
divergence between the observed trade structures, creating in this way no conditions
for a quality improvement of bilateral merchandise trade and indicating a further
slowdown in export and import flows between these economies.
Deteriorating trade quality (structure) between WB states indicates that there is lit-
tle room for any other kind of economic integration, including enhanced regional
cooperation, such as a customs union. Namely, as the empirical experience of devel-
oped countries, including economies in Central Europe, has shown, intra-industry
trade has opened up new areas of cooperation, leading to the development of GVCs.
Overall, the countries in the region are attracting FDI, mainly from the EU, thus
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creating value chains and, strongly associated with that, increasing trade flows with
the EU. But, in spite of that, the major problem for WB states remains their poor
integration into Europe’s developed GVCs, while trade within the region is limited
and tends to be bilateral rather than cluster-like. This is the case despite the fact that
WB states have seen a growth of trade in components and parts above the global
average, mostly due to factors of proximity, geography and labour cost differences,
and due to the international fragmentation of production (Shimbov et al., 2013). To
quote one example, the Fiat Chrysler Automobiles plant in Serbia exports cars to the
EU market, while its suppliers from N. Macedonia specialise in the production of
insulated electrical wiring. On top of that, there are market complementarities, such
as in tourism where, for instance, Montenegro and Albania might sell bundled travel
packages for tourist destinations. These sectors can further pull local manufacturing
or services and strengthen links between WB states. Similarly, Serbia’s growing ICT
market can source human resources from N. Macedonia or B&H (World Bank, 2018,
p. 27). Returning to merchandise trade, an indicative view was proposed by Ilahi
et al. (2019, pp. 3-10), who argues that linking up with GVCs could be greatly benefi-
cial for promoting exports, as they have proven to be an efficient way for smaller
economies, particularly in Europe, to raise exports and integrate into global trade.
When it comes to the third hypothesis, the findings referring to the change in the
structure of bilateral export and import are inconclusive, as is the additional part of
this chapter dealing with the dynamics of export and import concentration among
WB economies. Yet, it can be assumed, especially having in mind the tendencies of
WB exports both total and to the EU, which recorded a significant improvement in
the period under review, that the basic assumption of the article can be accepted with
some reservations. Namely, the trade structure among WB countries, although not
conclusively deteriorating, can also be seen as unfavourable. That includes both its
dynamics and especially the achieved level of export sophistication, given the
improvement of the export structure of these states to the EU or of their total export,
but also the tendencies of export structures worldwide.
While this research has identified many relevant trade tendencies among WB
states, it is far from encompassing all relevant export and import flows in the region.
In fact, the issue is not exhausted by the findings in this study, and there are several
further research avenues such as different time periods and a more in-depth look
into the change of product structures. Some of the questions raised, especially regard-
ing the reasons for the lack of deepening of cooperation between WB countries (espe-
cially given the growing role of the EU for all of the observed economies) have been
answered, but some may find the answers insufficiently empirically grounded. In add-
ition, a three-digit level of disaggregation cannot adequately capture individual prod-
ucts in trade with each other, which is often very important given how small these
economies are. Unit Value indicators may be helpful in pointing out differences in
product quality, but they are often lacking, especially at a higher level of disaggrega-
tion. In addition, we do not have structures for the period before 2007, while the
non-mirroring of statistics is often unacceptably frequent.
Yet, the future prospects of CEFTA in the context of a possible deepening of
cooperation among these individual economies, despite the doubts raised, remain
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open. It seems certain that fresh analytical approaches might be necessary to encom-
pass the reality of the WB trade structure, in an attempt to determine the rational
scope of trade integration between these countries.
Based on our research, it seems that there is no strong justification for the pro-
posed deepening of economic cooperation among WB states. Practically all three
hypotheses tested in this article, to a lesser or to a larger extent, suggest or imply the
decreasing significance of regional trade flows, with at best stagnant bilateral export-
import structures. Namely, trade structures among WB states, despite not deteriorat-
ing or improving on average in the period under review, can be regarded as
unfavourable given the improvement of the export structure of these states to the rest
of the world or to the EU, and bearing in mind the generally favourable tendencies
of export structures worldwide. Additionally, using intra-industry trade indicators,
divergences between WB trade structures were detected, thereby indicating no room
for the acceleration of bilateral export and import flows.
8. Policy Implications
When it comes to the practical implications of this research, it is certain that
there are numerous problems regarding possible deeper integration in the WB.
First, the true question is the reality of the current relations among WB econo-
mies and the degree of their genuine willingness to pursue economic cooperation
with each other. In this regard, there are fears that the larger countries would
dominate and benefit far more than the smaller ones, which is a factor hampering
initiatives for deeper regional integrations. Third, the conditions for a successful
customs union, such as the EU, are quite specific and work well when members
have similar economic profiles and exchange similar products, which is not the
case in the WB. Additionally, creating a customs union does not eliminate
administrative barriers such as border cheques – a single market is needed for
that. An example of that is Turkey, which is in a customs union with the EU, but
that doesn’t prevent huge queues of trucks forming on the Turkish-Bulgarian
border (The Economist, 2017).
The idea that a Balkan customs union attached to the EU could be an emergency
solution, without having to expand the EU, is unrealistic given the historical legacy of
animosity in the region as well as the non-complementarity of these economies. Also,
another similar proposal was about establishing a sort of ‘pre-membership’.
According to such a project, WB countries would take part in EU decision-making
processes as observers, without voting rights, on issues that are of concern for the
region, which is not an encouraging solution for WB states.
There is no doubt that the existence of CEFTA is moderately beneficial, at least
because it instigates cooperation among those states. However, before CEFTA’s foun-
dation, the dominant portion of merchandise trade among WB states was covered by
bilateral free trade agreements, so when the (revised) CEFTA was inaugurated in
2006, the existing trading patterns were mostly confirmed. One of CEFTA’s notable
limitations is the weak coordination of the different states’ trade policies.
Additionally, the legacy of the former Yugoslavia’s internal markets, along with their
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consumer habits, the large number of ethnicities living outside their own domicile
states, as well as practically the same languages used in Albania and Kosovo or
Serbia, B&H and Montenegro, are all factors pushing for stronger cooperation
between those countries, regardless of CEFTA. For example, the crisis in the 1990s,
which involved armed conflicts and sanctions, distorted the later achieved results by
artificially increasing them from a very low base. Without the former Yugoslavia, WB
bilateral trade flows would have been much lower, as was the case with the trade of
these states with Albania. Also, in analysing the CEFTA record, specific realities must
be taken into account, such as the legacy of armed conflicts and animosities that had
an adverse impact on trade. Finally, the dominant trading and, more generally, eco-
nomic partner for all WB states is the EU.
In general, all given conclusions implicitly suggest a need for the acceleration of
the EU enlargement process, which is currently at a practical standstill. Namely, if the
WB countries lose the European track it will backfire on the EU in terms of security
and migration, as well as in the context of interest representation. Also, the vacuum
potentially left by the non-fulfillment of EU promises could easily be filled with
Russian, Turkish and even Chinese interests (Fenkart, 2019).
The previous conclusions suggest that there does not seem to be room for any
other deeper kind of economic integration, especially among non-complementary
economies – which is the case with those in the WB. It means that deepening cooper-
ation in the region is not the answer to the existing economic problems in the WB.
All of this suggests that there is no solid reason to believe that strengthening bilateral
economies ties, particularly towards a customs union, is the right policy – especially
in view of the more attractive prospect of EU integration.
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Appendix
Table A3. Standard Grubel–Lloyd index of intra-industry trade of WB countries with EU28 in 2007
and 2018.
SERBIA B&H ALBANIA N. MACED. MONTENEGRO KOSOVO
2007 2018 2007 2018 2007 2018 2007 2018 2007 2018 2007 2018
0.342 0.572 0.339 0.407 0.262 0.296 0.215 0.307 0.067 0.101 0.055 0.101
Source: Author’s own calculation based on the United Nation COMTRADE Database.
Table A1. The average trade growth rate 2007-18; total and to the rest of the WB (expressed
in EUR).
Exports Imports
Serbia Total 8.7 4.5
Serbia - the WB 4.2 2.4
Kosovo Total 7.5 7.1
Kosovo - the WB 9.3 4.2
B&H Total 6.5 3.0
B&H - the WB 5.7 3.5
N. Macedonia Total 8.3 6.6
N. Macedonia - the WB 0.6 5.6
Albania Total 10.8 4.7
Albania - the WB 16.4 6.5
Montenegro Total 6.0 1.6
Montenegro - the WB 0.3 1.5
Sources: Data for 2018 from CEFTA official portal (https://statistics.cefta.int/goods), apart from Montenegro where
MONSTAT data were used http://monstat.org/userfiles/file/spoljna%20trgovina/2018/12/Spoljnotrgovinska%20robna%
20razmjena%20Crne%20Gore%20jan-dec%202018.pdf.
Serbia for 2007: file:///D:/00000%20sep%20dec%202019/Western%20Balknas%20SRB%20exports%20import%203%
20SITC%202007%202018/Srbija%202008%202007%20izvoz%20uvoz%20EUR.pdf.
Montenegro for 2007: http://monstat.org/cg/page.php?id=171&pageid=171.
B&H for 2007: http://www.bhas.ba/saopstenja/2007/ETS_2007M12_001_01.pdf.
Albania for 2007: http://www.instat.gov.al/media/1472/foreign-trade-2005-2009.pdf.
Kosovo for 2007: http://askdata.rks-gov.net/PXWeb/pxweb/sr/askdata/askdata__External%20trade__Yearly%20indica-
tors/tab08.px/?rxid=f81b30b9-6944-42e9-bdfa-726b83f624ee.
N. Macedonia for 2007: http://www.stat.gov.mk/Publikacii/7.4.10.01.pdf.
Table A2. The Volume and Growth of WB6’s Total Trade and Trade with the EU28 2007-2018
(EUR million, %).
WB 6’s Exports WB 6’s Imports
Export to the EU 2007 9144 Import from the EU 2007 17929
Export to the EU 2018 22302 Import from the EU 2018 29716
The average annual growth rate 2007-18 8.4% The average annual growth rate 2007-18 4.7%
Total export 2007 13516 Total import 2007 31139
Total export 2018 32327 Total import 2018 50363
The average annual growth rate 2007-18 8.3% The average annual growth rate 2007-18 4.5%
% of export to the EU in total export 2007 67.7% % of import to the EU in total import 2007 57.6
% of export to the EU in total export 2018 69.0% % of import to the EU in total import 2018 59.0
Sources: EUROSTAT (online) Database: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tet00036/default/table?lang=
en (accessed September 12, 2019); Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2007. http://www.bhas.ba/saop-
stenja/2007/ETS_2007M12_001_01.pdf (author’s own calculation on the basis of data of Agency for Statistics of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2007; accessed September 27, 2019); Kosovo agency of statistics (http://ask.rks-gov.net/en/
kosovo-agency-of-statistics); The statistical service in Republic of Albania (http://www.instat.gov.al/media/1472/for-
eign-trade-2005-2009.pdf).
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Table A6. Herfindahl-Hirschmann index for WB countries trade with EU 28 in 2007 and 2018.
SERBIA ALBANIA B&H MONTENEGRO N. MACED. KOSOVO
2007 0.135 0.249 0.152 0.784 0.265 0.282
2018 0.104 0.254 0.126 0.339 0.261 0.211
Source: Author’s own calculation based on the UN COMTRADE Database..
Table A4. Shares of (Medium- and) High-Tech products, High-skill and technology-intensive
manufacture products, and Skill-intensive manufactures in WB exports 2007 and 2018.
High-Tech High Skill Tech-Int. Skill-Intensive MediumþHigh
2007 2018 2007 2018 2007 2018 2007 2018
SRB 6.4 7.5 13.5 12.8 23.4 36.7 25.4 38.4
MAC 2.9 4.1 4.4 25.0 7.9 34.9 27.2 58.3
KOS 9.8 1.7 2.2 7.1 14.3 10.0 27.1 27.1
B&H 2.4 3.2 6.0 10.3 17.1 21.5 16.9 20.5
ALB 2.2 0.1 2.4 0.1 4.4 0.4 12.2 2.0
MNE 3.3 0.7 6.4 1.0 9.9 15.4 12.0 16.6
Note: High Skill¼ high-skill and technology-intensive manufactures; Skill-Intensive¼ Skill-intensive manufactures;
MediumþHigh ¼ (Combined) Medium- and high-tech products; High Skill Tech-Intensive¼ high-skill and technol-
ogy-intensive manufactures. For B&H, Albania, and Montenegro data in the 2007 columns are for 2011.
Source: Author’s own calculation based on the UN COMTRADE database.
Table A5. Shares of goods at higher levels of processing in WB merchandise export to the EU 28.
SERBIA B&H ALBANIA N. MACED. MONTEN. KOSOVO
2007 2018 2007 2018 2007 2018 2007 2018 2007 2018 2007 2018
Skill-intensive
manufactures
21.2 40.5 20.0 25.0 4.6 7.8 4.1 61.5 2.2 23.8 19.0 8.0
MediumþHigh 23.2 41.1 20.2 22.3 4.8 9.2 26.5 62.2 5.4 24.2 21.7 12.6
Source: Author’s own calculation based on the UN COMTRADE Database (and Kosovo’s statistics).
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